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Abstract 
The last European elections of 2014 were characterized by a concrete effort to increase public 
participation to the European political debate. However the overall electoral turnout remained 
disappointingly low. In this paper I deal with the problem of the formation of a European electorate 
and argue that a better representation on the European integration dimension should substantially 
contribute to the formation of a transnational electorate. Often, there is the fear that European political 
conflict framed on this dimension would lead to a radical bipolar conflict between pro- and anti-EU 
parties. In this paper I show that, if citizens’ preferences are properly represented, this does not have to 
be the case. What I show is that citizens’ preferences on European integration are distributed in three 
roughly equivalent blocs: pro-EU, anti-EU and a neutral position. The point I make is that a proper 
representation of the neutral position should ensure that the conflict does not become too radical, as 
the parties representing the neutral position would be the necessary coalition partners of both pro- and 
anti-EU parties. An important shortcoming of the current European parliament, I argue, is that the 
neutral position on European integration is not represented and that consequently there is a 
disproportionate high presence of pro-EU parties. This misrepresentation in the long run may increase 
the public appeal of Euro-sceptic parties. The data on which my argument is based are from the 2014 
Eurobarometer survey.  
Keywords 
EU; Democratic Deficit; European Integration; Representation; European Parliament; Euroscepticism; 
European electorate 
 1 
Introduction 
For the first time in the history of the European Union, at the European elections of 2014 voters had a 
chance to directly express their preference for the presidency of the Commission. During the 
campaign, in fact, the main party-families of the European Parliament (EP) indicated before-hand who 
their preferred candidate was, with the concrete expectation that the Council would take the results of 
the elections into account when bringing its proposal for the presidency of the Commission. This 
novelty created high hopes for breaking the trend of low electoral turnout that has always 
characterized European elections (Hix 2013). However, the 2014 elections registered the lowest 
turnout ever in the history of European elections (Euractiv 2014a). This scarce public participation 
represents an open wound for the aspirations of democratizing policy-making within the EU, as it 
indicates that a truly European electorate has not yet been formed. The question then is if such an 
electorate can ever be formed. In this paper I answer this question positively, arguing however that the 
requirement is that parties at the European level compete on the dimension of European integration. 
My argument is both prescriptive and causal. With the prescriptive side of my argument I introduce 
the idea that the process of European integration creates new conflicts that need political 
representation and that these conflicts are shared by all the different national electorates. With the 
causal side of my argument, I report Eurobarometer (2014) data that show that citizens’ preferences 
regarding European integration are similarly distributed all over Europe. With this data I explore how 
a European party-system shaped around the European integration dimension could develop. 
The main point I make with my causal argument is in many ways a response to the fear openly 
expressed by the European political elite that political confrontation on European integration would 
lead to a radical bipolar conflict between pro- and anti-Euro parties, and thus inevitably to a 
referendum on the Euro (The Independent 2013; The Telegraph 2010). Contrary to this fear, with the 
Eurobarometer data I show that on the European integration dimension the main electoral power is in 
the middle and not on the extremes. Consequently, given that the EP has a proportional electoral 
system (Lijphart 1999), my expectation is that on this dimension a multiparty system would form in 
which parties with the most moderate views would constitute the main electoral force. These parties 
would then also be in a position to play a pivot role, as they could alternatively decide to ally with the 
parties favoring more integration or with the more Euro-sceptic parties. Following this logic, the 
political confrontation on European integration should lead to a moderate and not to a radical political 
confrontation. The doom scenario feared by the European political elite, instead, could eventually take 
place as a consequence of the disproportionate presence of pro-EU parties in the current EP. The pro-
European parties in fact occupy around 70% of the total seats, whereas the pro-EU citizens, as the 
Eurobarometer (2014) data show, amount to roughly 30%. In the final section of the paper I therefore 
unite the implications of both sides of my argument and argue that the misrepresentation of citizens’ 
preferences in the current EP may gradually increase the public appeal of the claims of Euro-sceptic 
parties, who will most probably be isolated in the parliament (BBC News 2014). Consequently, if at 
the next election voters are faced with the choice between pro- and anti-EU parties, the vote-share of 
the latter might dangerously increase. At that point, the doom scenario feared by the European 
political elite might indeed take place.  
Before developing my argument, in section 1 I first sketch the debate regarding the democratic 
deficit in the EU and indicate where my argument stands in this debate. Departing from this 
discussion, in section 2 I develop the prescriptive side of my argument. The core of the paper is 
section 3, in which the Eurobarometer data are reported. In the final section, I look at the implications 
of both sides of my argument for the current EP. I conclude by reflecting on what kind of empirical 
validation my argument still needs. 
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1. The democratic deficit problem in the EU  
The claims about a lack of democratic legitimacy in EU policy-making and the need to reduce this 
deficit are not uncontested. The advocates of these claims (for example Follesdal & Hix 2006; Scharpf 
2012; Streeck & Schmitter 1991) indicate a number of factors causing there to be a democratic deficit. 
One of these factors is that the main European institutions are ‘too distant’ (Hix & Hoyland 2011: 132) 
from European citizens: the Commission for example is in many ways something in-between a 
government and a bureaucracy that is appointed according to (for the citizens) obscure procedures. 
Another factor is that the policy process tends to be highly technocratic and therefore does not really 
lend itself for clear political preferences. Consequently, the elections for the European parliament tend 
to be fought on national rather than European issues, and therefore cannot be considered really 
'European' elections (Reif & Schmitt 1997). Moreover, as national ministers are, next to the 
Commission, the main decision-makers in EU politics, the power of national parliaments vis a vis their 
executives has decreased (Hix & Hoyland 2011: 132). The advocates of the democratic deficit 
argument therefore argue that all these factors together result in the adoption of policies that are not 
supported by a majority of European citizens (Hix & Hoyland 2011: 133). 
The main arguments against the claims about a democratic deficit have been raised by Majone 
(2002) and Moravcsik (2008). Majone (2002) argues that policy-making at the European level does 
not need political representation in the traditional sense: the EU produces mainly regulatory policies 
that aim at correcting market failures and therefore, in order to be efficient and effective, the policy-
process needs to be technical rather than political. While Majone's (2002) argument practically 
circumvents the issue by claiming that there is no need for democratic legitimation of European 
policies, Moravcsik (2008) argues that the EU does have democratic legitimacy because on the one 
hand national governments are directly accountable to their citizens and on the other there has been a 
significant increase of powers of the European Parliament. Moreover, the system of checks-and-
balances that characterizes the policy-making process of the EU ensures that policies are agreed on the 
basis of a large consensus. 
The developments after the out-break of the Euro-zone crisis, however, with the increased pressure 
of European institutions on national governments to implement austerity measures, raise a number of 
problems about the points made by Majone (2002) and Moravcsik (2008). First of all, as the austerity 
measures promoted by the European Council and Commission have considerable consequences on the 
different national welfare states, it becomes very difficult to hold that EU politics is merely about 
regulatory policies. Secondly, even though it is true that national governments are directly accountable 
to their citizens, it is also true that there is an increased tendency of national politicians to defend their 
policies as being the result of European agreements on which they had very little influence (Alonso 
2014). Thirdly, while it is true that the European Parliament has increased its powers considerably, to 
the extent that it is now a co-decision-maker on the EU budget (Hix 2013), it must also be 
remembered that the European elections are not fought on European issues and therefore the EP does 
not represent citizens' preferences in this regard. As a consequence of all this, it is questionable 
whether the consensus on the basis of which policies are agreed at the European level is representative 
of the preferences of a majority of European citizens. 
This debate about the democratic deficit can be synthesized through Scharpf's (2012) distinction 
between input- and output-legitimacy, where input-legitimacy refers to the extent to which an 
executive is representative of a majority of the population and output legitimacy refers to the extent to 
which an executive serves the common good. The advocates of the democratic deficit argument point 
mainly to a lack of input-legitimacy: as there is no European electorate, the executive of the EU cannot 
be representative of a European majority. The defenders of the legitimacy of the EU, on the other 
hand, emphasize aspects of output-legitimacy: as the EU is mainly concerned with correcting market 
failures, its policies are aimed at the common good and therefore the policy process should remain 
technocratic rather than become political. Scharpf's (2012) argument is that, while the EU always 
lacked input-legitimacy, before the financial crisis of 2008 it did have a certain extent of output-
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legitimacy, as there was a general consensus that EU policies aimed at correcting market failures and 
therefore aimed at the common good. Since the crisis, however, and mainly with the growing 
dissatisfaction with the austerity measures, the EU seems to be losing also a large part of its output-
legitimacy (Scharpf 2012). 
The solution that Scharpf (2012: 30) proposes to this situation is to 'stop defending the Euro' and to 
go back to pre-1999 European Monetary System. However, as Scharpf (2012) also recognizes, EU 
policy-makers have ruled out this option. The alternative solution, according to Scharpf, would be to 
decrease the demand for legitimacy by decreasing the political salience of EU policies. In my view, 
however, the need for input-legitimacy at the European level is not only a matter per se, but it is 
functional to the further output-legitimation of EU policies: there is a need to define a European 
common good and the parameters within which a European executive should work to achieve that. 
European elections should therefore become an arena for confrontation between different views on 
European integration. If the EP elections are fought on European issues, there can potentially be a 
democratic input about the direction Europe should go. More specifically, if European integration 
constitutes the main dimension of representation in the EP, then the question about whether to move 
towards a European super-state or reduce the EU to some form of cooperation among member-states 
can be decided upon through the traditional democratic game of party-competition and elections. In 
the following sections I explore the pre-conditions and possibilities for this transformation of 
European political competition. 
2. Towards a new dimension of conflict 
The EU as we know it today is the result of ‘a process of voluntary integration among the nation states 
of Europe’ (Hix & Hoyland 2011: 1). This process is characterized by the lowering of internal borders 
and the creation of new external border outside the EU (Bartolini 1998: 48). Consequently, this 
process simultaneously creates new ‘requests of exit’and ‘new requests of closure’ (Bartolini 1998: 
48). In other words, European integration is a process that creates new winners and losers and 
therefore can be considered as a new source of conflict. The conflict I am referring to is the same 
conflict as the one identified by Kriesi et al (2008; 2012) between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers of 
globalization’: in both cases the conflict originates from the opening up of national borders, which 
gives rise to new opportunities and new threats. The ‘winners’ are of course those individuals capable 
of taking advantage of the new opportunities, whereas the losers are those individuals who fear their 
life chances will no longer be protected with the opening up of national boundaries (Kriesi et al 2008: 
4-5). Even though this new conflict has given rise to new political forces, mostly on the populist right, 
political conflict in European countries is nevertheless still mainly framed along the traditional 
economic left-right divide (Kriesi et al 2008; 2012). 
As European elections tend to be mainly fought on national political issues (Reif & Schmitt 1997), 
the two biggest party-families in the EP are the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) and the 
centre-left alliance of Socialists & Democrats (S&D). These two party-groups include almost all 
mainstream parties from the different European countries. Their standpoints are reported in the table 
below. 
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Table 1 – S&D and EPP standpoints 
Socialists & Democrats European People's Party 
 Principles: freedom, equality, solidarity, 
diversity and fairness 
 Commitments: social justice, jobs and 
growth, consumer rights, sustainable 
development, financial market reform and 
human rights 
 
 Priorities: fight unemployment, ensure 
that societies and markets become fairer, 
give people back trust in the EU 
 
 
Source: http://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/mission-
vision-values 
 
 Principles: more competitive and 
democratic Europe 
 Commitments: social market economy, 
good economic governance, 
competitiveness, sound financial 
regulation, consumer protection, solidarity, 
growth and jobs, sustainable development 
 Priorities: support the Eastern and 
Southern Neighborhood, improve 
regulation of the financial system, protect 
consumers 
 
Source: http://www.eppgroup.eu/ 
Both party-groups express their commitment to the social market economy and their respective views 
differ only on the modalities through which the market economy should be developed: the S&D group 
puts slightly more emphasis on social justice and the EPP on economic competitiveness. The issue of 
European integration, thus the lowering of national borders, however, remains out of the competition. 
The issue, in fact, does not constitute any source of conflict between the two party-groups, as 
mainstream parties across Europe, especially at the elite level, are generally strongly pro-European 
integration (Hix & Hoyland 2011: 138; Crum 2007). As these parties tend to win around 80% of votes 
in national elections, mainly by competing on the left-right dimension, in the EP there is a strong 
presence of pro-European political parties. The pro-European citizens, on the other hand, as I’ll show 
in section 3, amount to roughly 30% of the electorate. Consequently, this mismatch between parties 
and the electorate may lead to situations like in 2005, when the EU Constitutional Treaty of 2005 was 
supported by almost all European mainstream parties (Crum 2007), but voted down by voters in 
referenda in France and the Netherlands. This incident, in my view, is a significant example of how 
the misrepresentation of the electorate on the dimension of European integration may undermine the 
democratic legitimacy of the institutional architecture of the EU. 
Representation on the European integration dimension in the EP, moreover, would be 
complementary to the representation on the economic left-right dimension in the national parliaments. 
The new emerging conflict between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization has, overall, only partly 
been integrated in the national party-systems (Kriesi et al 2008; 2012). The demands of the ‘losers’ 
have been mainly captured by parties at the extremes of the political landscape who tend to express 
these demands mainly in cultural terms. Thus, while these demands are essentially about material 
interests, such us maintaining job securities, they tend to be expressed by the parties in cultural terms, 
such as the need to defend the national culture. The national political arenas, thus, seem to not have 
yet fully succeeded in integrating this dimension of conflict and, in my view, the European arena 
would be much more appropriate for representing the conflict: while at the national level parties 
compete on the extent to which the state should intervene in the economy (left-right divide), it would 
make sense that at the European level parties compete on the extent to which states should lower their 
borders. This would create a double sphere of representation in which the European sphere exploits a 
transnational political conflict and the national sphere would continue to function along the left-right 
divide. The representation of the left-right divide at the European level is, in fact, in some way at the 
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heart of the difficulties for the formation of the European electorate: as every member state has a 
different economy and a different political system, there can be no clear transnational demands 
regarding the relationship between the government and the economy. What is shared by the different 
national electorates, instead, is the process of European integration. In the next section I show how, 
according to data on citizens’ views on the issue, this dimension does indeed offer the prospects for 
the formation of a transnational European electorate. 
3. A party system around the dimension of European integration 
As the EU is the result of the integration process (Hix & Hoyland 2011: 1), I consider the image that 
people have of the EU as the expression of the extent to which they favor more or less European 
integration. The Eurobarometer surveys present the question whether the EU ‘does conjure up to a 
very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?’ (Eurobarometer 2014: 
6). In table 2 (below), I report the time-trends of the responses. The ‘very’ and ‘fairly 
positive/negative’ responses are clustered into one group. 
Table 2: Citizens’ views on EU: time trend 
 Average 
2006-2009 
period 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Positive 47,33% 42,00% 40,00% 31,00% 30,00% 35,00% 
Neutral 34,55% 37,00% 38,00% 39,00% 39,00% 38,00% 
Negative 15,66% 19,00% 20,00% 28,00% 29,00% 25,00% 
Source: Eurobarometer spring 2014 
Compared to the 2006-2009 period, in the last five years the number of citizens with a positive image 
of the EU has considerably decreased, while the number of people with a negative image has 
increased, with the result that the two groups are slowly becoming equivalent in size. This trend seems 
to have slightly reversed in the last year, but on average, compared to the pre-crisis period, the number 
of people with a positive view has decreased by roughly 10%, while people with a negative view have 
increased by 10%. The group of citizens expressing a neutral view, instead, has remained relatively 
constant, increasing over the last eight years from around 35% to 38%. Since 2012, thus, the 
preferences on European integration seem to be distributed in three roughly equivalent blocs.  
The data on people’s opinion on the European Monetary Union (EMU) feature a strikingly parallel 
trend. The data are reported in Table 3 (below). Important to note is that the ‘neutral’ answer was not 
available to respondents. The available answers were ‘in favor’, ‘against’ or ‘no opinion’ 
(Eurobarometer 2014: 19). 
Table 3: Citizens’ opinion on EMU 
 Average 
2006-2009 
period 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
In favor 60,62% 56,00% 56,00% 52,00% 51,00% 55,00% 
Against 32,50% 37,00% 37,00% 40,00% 42,00% 36,00% 
Source: Eurobarometer spring 2014 
Similarly as with people’s image of the EU, also with regards to the EMU there is a simultaneous 
decrease of views in favor and an increase of the views against. Moreover, the data in Table 3 suggest 
that with the absence of a ‘neutral’ option, the preferences tend to be split in two blocs, one in favor 
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and one against. If we put the figures of 2014 from the two tables next to each other, the following 
picture emerges: 
Figure 1: Citizens’ views on EU and EMU 
 
Positive image of EU= 35% 
 
 
In favor of EMU= 55% 
 
Neutral image of EU= 38% 
 
Against EMU= 36% 
 
Negative image of EU= 25% 
Assuming that citizens with a positive image of the EU in general are in favor of EMU and that 
citizens with a negative image are against, from the picture sketched in Figure 1 it can be deduced that 
a party system shaped around the dimension of European integration could develop in two ways. 
Following the theory of issue voting by Rabinowitz & MacDonald (1989), parties could polarize the 
competition by giving a clear direction to their position: for example, the confrontation on European 
integration could be framed simply in terms of being for or against EMU. This is what tends to happen 
when mainstream political parties are confronted by Euro-sceptic parties, and is also the doom 
scenario feared by the European political elite. Following this logic, a bipolar party-system would 
form where the voter can choose between a much deeper integration and the break-up of the Eurozone. 
On the other hand, following Down’s (1957) economic theory of political action, parties could 
compete in order to win the preference of the voters placed in the center of the dimension of conflict. 
Following this logic, parties would be incentivized to moderate their positions towards the center in 
order to win more votes. Moreover, on the basis of the evidence regarding the relationship between 
electoral systems and party-systems (Lijphart 1999), the proportional electoral system of the EU 
should guarantee the formation of a multiparty system. Consequently, being at the center of the 
dimension of conflict is not only functional for winning votes, but brings also substantial strategic 
advantages. Parties in the center, in fact, would be in a position to play a pivot role, as they could 
alternatively decide whether to ally with the pro- or anti-EU sides. Figure 2 (below) sketches this 
scenario.  
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Figure 2: A three-polar party-system 
 
The pro-EU, center and anti-EU parties would respectively represent the positive, neutral and negative 
images held by the citizens on the EU. The coalition spaces represent the theoretical spaces on the 
European integration dimension where alliances for legislative action could form. The idea is that 
coalitions can only be formed in the central parts of the dimension and not at the extremes. This idea 
derives from theories on coalition formation (Gamson 1961; Laver 1997), according to which 
coalitions are formed on the basis of ideological proximity and the need to form a majority. Given the 
distribution of preferences, thus, the center parties are the necessary coalition partners for both sides of 
the conflict, as for both pro-EU and anti-EU parties they are the ideologically closest and the 
necessary allies to form a majority. The center parties, consequently, can decide to alternate coalition 
formation with one side or the other, following their own strategic preferences. This alternation of 
coalitions will ensure two things. First that, contrary to the fears expressed by the European political 
elite (The Independent 2013; The Telegraph 2010), the legislative action deriving from representation 
on European integration would result in moderate and not radical decisions. Second, that these 
legislative actions would be highly representative of citizens’ preferences on European integration. If 
we look more in detail at the responses given regarding the image of the EU, in fact, the following 
distribution emerges: 
 
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Citizens' image of EU
Graph 1: Citizens' image of EU 
Very positive Fairly positive Neutral Fairly negative Very negative
More integration 
Coalition space 
Less integration 
Coalition space 
Center parties Pro-EU parties Anti-EU parties 
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This distribution approximates a normal distribution, showing that also the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ 
views tend to be moderate rather than extreme. Therefore, the sum of the two coalition spaces 
theorized in figure 2 would match the preferences on European integration of around 85% of European 
citizens. Moreover, the distribution of preferences on this dimension remains strikingly similar at the 
different national levels. In table 4 (below) I report the numbers from a sample of European countries. 
Table 4: Citizens’ image of the EU in different countries 
 Very positive Fairly 
positive 
Neutral Fairly 
negative 
Very negative 
France 5% 33% 34% 20% 7% 
Germany 4% 32% 43% 17% 3% 
Italy 2% 28% 38% 22% 7% 
Netherlands 3% 32% 40% 22% 3% 
Finland 2% 32% 44% 18% 3% 
Hungary  2% 31% 45% 16% 5% 
Spain 2% 23% 43% 23% 6% 
United Kingdom 3% 20% 36% 24% 12% 
Greece 2% 20% 34% 25% 19% 
Croatia 7% 34% 39% 13% 7% 
Source: Eurobarometer 2014, Appendix 
The data show that in countries as diverse as Germany and Greece, or Croatia and the Netherlands, 
citizens’ image of the EU tends to be neutral. This similarity across countries confirms that this 
dimension of conflict does indeed constitute a political space on the basis of which a transnational 
European electorate could form. The data reported in tables 2 and 4 in fact shows that the citizens 
holding a ‘neutral’ view on European integration constitute a stable electoral group both across time 
and across countries. The electoral strength of the center on this dimension is shown also by the 
distribution of answers to other related questions on European integration. The graph below shows the 
distribution of preferences on whether more decisions should be taken at the EU level. The option 
‘neutral’ was not available to respondents. Despite that, the majority of the preferences are still 
grouped around the center. 
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
More decisions at the EU level
Graph 2: Citizens' opinion on having more decisions made at EU 
level 
Totally agree Tend to agree Tend to disagree Totally disagree
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Again, the data show that the majority of European citizens have a moderate rather than an extreme 
view on the extent to which decisions should be more or less taken at the EU level. Around 60% of the 
respondents, in fact, preferred to answer ‘tend to’ rather than ‘totally (dis)agree’.  
Besides reaffirming the stability and the strength of the electoral group placed on the center, 
however, graph 2 also shows that, with the absence of the ‘neutral’ option, the electorate may be split 
in a pro- and anti-EU front. This means that the threat of a bipolar political conflict on European 
integration would always be latent. This scenario must be avoided through the identification and 
representation of the demands of the ‘neutral’ citizens by political parties. This requires an exploration 
of this electoral group. While it is relatively intuitive that the pro- and anti-EU citizens roughly 
respectively coincide with the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization, the identification of the ‘neutral’ 
group needs deeper empirical investigation. On an intuitive basis, two things can be expected from this 
group. The first thing is that the citizens in this group would, overall, be neither the ‘winners’ nor the 
‘losers’ of globalization: I expect these to be individuals that are either scarcely affected by the process 
of the lowering of national boundaries, or individuals that deal with both the advantages and the 
disadvantages of this process. The second thing is that this group would be suspicious of further 
European integration but at the same time it does not want to destroy the European project. The more 
specific demands, and how these could be translated into policy-programs, however, need to be further 
explored. What can be deducted from the existing data, is that this electoral group exists 
transnationally and that it has the potential to constitute the basis for solid electoral and political 
power. Also, the representation of this electoral group, next to being fundamental for avoiding the 
doom scenario feared by the European political elite, would substantially improve the representation 
of citizens’ preferences on European integration in the EP. Therefore, in my view, it would be a huge 
step in reducing the democratic deficit in the EU. In the current EP, however, I argue in the next 
section, this group does not seem to be represented and this shortcoming, I argue, may have dangerous 
consequences for the next elections of 2019. 
4. The dimension of European integration in the current European Parliament 
To say that European integration did not play a role in the campaigns for the 2014 Elections would be 
false. The campaign, in fact, saw the participation of Euro-sceptic parties who, all together, won 
around 24% of the total seats (Emmannouilidis & Stratulat 2014). The citizens with a negative view 
about the EU, thus, do indeed have their fair share of political representation in the current EP. The 
Euro-sceptic parties, however, are not a united front and in the run-up to the elections they failed or 
refused to bring forward a preferred candidate for the presidency of the Commission. Consequently, 
they did not participate in the presidential debates that were broadcasted live on television all over 
Europe. The race for the presidency of the Commission became thus mainly a competition between the 
traditional big party-families of the EP, with the main competitors being the EPP, S&D, the Alliance 
of European Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) and the Greens. The debates, however, did not succeed 
in increasing public participation and, moreover, in many ways they were characterized by a lack of 
political conflict (The Guardian 2014; Euractiv 2014b). This lack of political conflict is, in my view, 
attributable to lack of conflict on European integration. 
The lack of deep political conflict between the main party families has not only been relatively 
evident during the presidential debates, but is generally also observable in their voting behavior in the 
EP (Hix 2013). The EPP and S&D have repeatedly proven to be very united on issues in which 
division would require a divergent view on European integration. In the 2009-2013 Parliament, in fact, 
the EPP-S&D coalition, alternatively joined by ALDE and the Greens, has been strongly united in five 
policy areas: Budget, Constitutional Affairs, Legal Affairs, Fisheries and Agriculture (Hix: 2013: 5; 7; 
9). Position on these policy areas is very much dependent on the position on European integration, as 
policies in these areas generally have strong implications for the power-balances between the EU and 
the member-states. Moreover, these are also areas in which the EU has produced policies that are not 
supported by a majority of citizens in most member states (Hix & Hoyland 2011: 133). The left-right 
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divide that characterizes the political competition between the party-families, instead, resulted in 
divisions on other types of issues such as maternity leave or the phasing out of nuclear energy (Hix 
2013: 6-7). On the other hand, however, this divide did not prevent these parties (with the exception of 
ALDE) to vote together on an issue such as the introduction the European Financial Transaction Tax 
(Hix 2013: 8). Given that taxation is generally at the heart of the conflict between left- and right-wing 
parties, this particular case can be seen as an example of how the unity of these party families on 
European integration may even let them overcome their left-right divisions.  
Given that EPP, S&D, ALDE and the Greens jointly occupy around 70% of the total seats, a strong 
unity between them on a certain dimension deserves special attention. While among European citizens 
the preferences on European integration are grouped around the most moderate positions, in the 
current EP preferences are disproportionally distributed at the extremes: 70% pro-EU and 25% anti-
EU. This means that in the current EP the ‘neutral’ view, which is representative of the preferences of 
almost 40% of European citizens, is not represented. Instead, in the current EP there is a bipolar 
conflict on European integration in which the anti-EU side is likely to become an irrelevant minority 
(BBC News 2014). On the dimension of European integration, there is thus an evident over-
representation of pro-EU parties. If this disproportionate representation results in legislative action that 
excessively pushes towards more European integration, then the claims of the Euro-sceptic front may 
gain in public appeal and maybe even in democratic legitimacy. If 70% of the EP remains strongly 
pro-European, thus, the consequence may be that the vote share of anti-EU parties will significantly 
increase at the next elections. In order to avoid this, a consistent group of the pro-EU parties would 
have to moderate their views towards a more ‘neutral’ position during the course of this legislature. 
This strategy, moreover, as I have shown in section 3, can potentially bring electoral gains for these 
parties at the next elections, as the big majority of European citizens appear to have a moderate 
position on European integration. 
This argument about pro-EU parties having to moderate their positions on European integration, 
however, is based on a presumption and a claim that need further empirical investigation. The 
presumption is that public participation at European elections would substantially increase if European 
integration would become the main dimension of conflict. The claim is that across Europe there is a 
stable electoral group having a neutral position on European integration. In the case of the 
presumption, it needs to be assessed the extent to which voters regard European integration an issue 
that has a fundamental impact on their lives. This can to a certain extent be explored with data on the 
saliency that people give to issues related to European integration. A problem that would remain, 
however, is to know whether citizens are aware of the impact that decisions on these issue have on 
their lives. The claim about the stable ‘neutral’ electoral group, on the other hand, does have some 
stronger empirical foundations, as in section 3 I have shown that the size of this group remains stable 
both across time and across countries. However, the characteristics of the individuals composing this 
group remain almost totally unknown. As representation of this group is fundamental for the 
functioning of the multiparty system I theorized in this paper, it is extremely important to gather 
information about these individuals. If the presumption is empirically validated and the characteristics 
and demands of the ‘neutral’ electoral group are identified, then the arguments of this paper may be 
interesting for scholars dealing with the trans-nationalization of the European electoral landscape (for 
example Bright et al 2014), as well for parties wishing to adapt their strategies for the European 
elections of 2019. 
Conclusion 
The presidential debates held before the European elections of 2014 were a concrete effort to reduce 
the democratic deficit within the EU. However, they did not succeed in substantially reversing the 
trend of low electoral turnout. In this paper I have introduced and developed the idea about tackling 
this problem with a political confrontation on European integration. The idea is that, as this dimension 
of conflict is shared by all national political arenas, it can constitute the basis for the formation of a 
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transnational European electorate. On the basis of Eurobarometer (2014) data on public opinion, I 
have shown that if citizens’ preferences on this dimension are properly represented, then the 
confrontation on this dimension should take a moderate rather than a radical form. Therefore, a 
partisan competition framed on the basis of preferences on this dimension, besides stimulating the 
formation of a truly European electorate, should also allow for the continuation of a process of 
moderate European integration. With a little more empirical validation, the arguments of this paper 
may become relevant for scholars dealing with the democratic deficit within the EU as well as for 
parties competing at the European elections of 2019. 
  
Jan Karremans 
12 
Bibliography 
Alonso, S. (2014) “You can vote but you cannot choose: Democracy and the sovereign debt crisis in 
the Eurozone”, Estudio/Working Paper 2014/282, Instituto Mixto Carlos III. 
Bartolini, S. (1998) ‘Exit options, boundary building, political structuring’, Working Paper 320, 
European University Institute. 
BBC News (2014) Protest parties will force EU rethink , 26
th
 May 2014.  
Bright, J., D. Garzia, J. Lacey & A.H. Trechsel (2014) ‘Trans-nationalising Europe’s voting space’, 
RSCAS EUDO Working Paper 2014/02, European University Institute. 
Crum, B. (2007) ‘Party stances in the referendums on the EU Constitution: Causes and consequences 
of competition and collusion’, European Union Politics, 8(1): 61-82. 
Downs. A. (1957) ‘An economic theory of political action in a democracy’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 65(2): 135-150. 
Emmanouilidis, J.A. & C. Stratulat (2014) ‘Post-European Parliament Elections’, publication for 
Think Tank European Policy Center. 
Euractiv (2014a) It’s official: Last EU election had lowest-ever turnout, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/its-official-last-eu-election-had-
lowest-ever-turnout-307773 , viewed on 22.09.2014. 
Euractiv (2014b) Diversity wins as EU presidential candidates try to impress voters, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/diversity-wins-eu-presidential-candidates-try-
impress-voters-302179 , viewed on 22.09.2014. 
Eurobarometer (2014) Standard Eurobarometer 81, july 2014. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb81/eb81_en.htm , viewed on 22.09.2014. 
Follesdal, A. & S. Hix (2006) ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and 
Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(3): 533-62. 
Gamson, W. (1961) ‘A theory of coalition formation’, American Sociological Review, 26(3): 373-382. 
Hix, S. (2013) ‘Why the 2014 European Elections Matter: Ten Key Votes in the 2009–2013 European 
Parliament’, European Policy Analysis, September issue. 
Hix, S. & B. Hoyland (2011) The political system of the European Union, Basingstoke : Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Kriesi, H., E. Grande, R. Lachat, M. Dolezal, S. Bornschier, T. Frey (2008) West European politics in 
the age of globalization, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kriesi, H., E. Grande, M. Dolezal, M. Helbling, D. Hoglinger, S. Hutter, B. Wuest (2012) 
Political Conflict in Western Europe, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Laver, M. (1997) Private desires, political actions, London : Sage.  
Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy. New Haven, CT ; London: Yale University Press. 
Majone, G. (2002) ‘The European Commission: The limits of centralization and the perils of 
parliamentarization’, Governance, 15(3): 375-392. 
Moravcsik, A. (2008) ‘The myth of Europe’s democratic deficit’, Intereconomic: Journal of 
European Economic Policy, 43(6): 331-340. 
Rabinowitz, G. & S. E. MacDonald (1989) ‘A directional theory of issue-voting’, American 
Political Science Review, 83(1): 93-121. 
Why not solve the democratic deficit within the EU through genuine transnational political conflict? 
13 
Reif, K. & H. Schmitt (1997) ‘Second-order elections’, European Journal of Political Research, 31(1-
2): 109-124. 
Scharpf, F.W. (2012) ‘Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity’, MPIfG, 
Discussion Paper No. 12/6. 
Streeck, W. & P.C. Schmitter (1991) ‘From national corporatism to transnational pluralism: Organized 
interests in the Single European Market’, Politics & Society, 19(2): 133-164. 
The Guardian (2014) ‘The EC presidential debate was a bad advert for democracy in Europe’, 19th 
May 2014. 
The Independent (2013) Jose Manuel Barroso: Eurosceptics want to drag Continent back to the 
trenches, 11 September 2013. 
The Telegraph (2010) Herman Van Rompuy: Euroscepticism leads to war, 10 November 2010. 
  
Jan Karremans 
14 
Author contacts: 
 
Jan Karremans 
European University Institute 
Department of Political and Social Sciences 
Badia Fiesolana 
Via dei Roccettini 9 
I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
Email: Johannes.Karremans@EUI.eu 
